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This paper attempts to reconcile the conceptual conflict between typological and population 2 
thinking to provide a philosophical foundation for extended evolutionary synthesis (EES). 3 
Typological thinking has been considered a pre-Darwinian, essentialist dogma incompatible 4 
with population thinking, which is the core notion of Darwinism. More recent philosophical 5 
and historical studies suggest that a non-essentialist form of typology (i.e., representational 6 
typology) has some advantages in the study of evolutionary biology. However, even if we 7 
adopt such an epistemological interpretation of typological thinking, there still remains an 8 
epistemological and methodological conflict between these two styles of thinking. How can 9 
we relate typological thinking with population thinking in pursuit of more integrated or 10 
interconnected research into evolutionary biology? I propose that homology thinking, which 11 
is another style of thinking that recognizes homologous characters, provides a common basis 12 
for typological representations of character states and for character dynamics in an evolving 13 
population. Good examples of this bridging role are found in teratology and breeding, where 14 
variation and novelty are recognized in developmental and morphological traits, gene 15 
expression patterns, and so on. Essentialism-free, dynamic views of homology have great 16 
potential to reconcile typological and population thinking and to set the stage for the EES. 17 
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1. Introduction 22 
It is widely accepted that developmental biology and morphology have been excluded from 23 
the evolutionary synthesis (ES) or modern synthesis, and have contributed much less to the 24 
ES (Churchill 1980; Coleman 1980; Ghiselin 1980, 2006; Hamburger 1980; Amundson 25 
2005; Laubichler and Maienschein 2007). This exclusion has often been attributed to a 26 
conceptual gap between typological and population thinking (Mayr 1959a, 1959b; Mayr 27 
1980; Ghiselin 1980; Amundson 2005). On the one hand, developmental biology and 28 
morphology appeal to various “types” in their explanations. For example, idealistic 29 
morphologists, such as Owen (1848), postulated idealized typical forms (i.e., “archetypes”) 30 
of body parts. On the other hand, Darwinism and population genetics, which occupy the 31 
theoretical core of the ES, are based on the notion that the evolutionary unit is a population, 32 
and that evolution can be explained by trans-generational changes, mainly generated by 33 
genetic factors, in the population. 34 
 The relationship between these two styles of thinking was first formulated as an 35 
unavoidable conflict between two metaphysical views (Mayr 1959b). Recently, some 36 
historical and philosophical studies have argued against this formulation (Levit and Meister 37 
2006; Lewens 2009a, 2009b; Love 2009). According to them, typological thinking does not 38 
have to be metaphysical; it can be, and historically has often been, a methodological tool, 39 
which can contribute to certain kinds of biological research without involving a problematic 40 
metaphysics. I agree with these authors that typological thinking does not have to be 41 
metaphysical and that it is more fruitful to interpret typological thinking from an 42 
epistemological and/or methodological viewpoint. However, I point out that even at the 43 
epistemological and methodological level, there is a gap between population and typological 44 
thinking: typological thinking ignores variation within a taxon by idealizing characters as 45 
discrete states, whereas variation is essential for population thinking to explain character 46 
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dynamics. This gap can be an obstacle to recent attempts at an extended evolutionary 47 
synthesis (EES) or a new synthesis inclusive of evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-48 
Devo) (Laland et al. 2015; Laubichler and Maienschein 2007; Pigliucci and Müller 2010). 49 
Although the two styles of thinking are meaningfully used within distinctive areas of 50 
evolutionary research, if we aim to integrate or interconnect these areas in a more 51 
comprehensive way, the gap between the two styles of thinking needs to at least be bridged.1  52 
 In this paper, I examine if it is possible to bridge the gap between typological and 53 
population thinking with “homology thinking.” This style of thinking was proposed by 54 
Ereshefsky (2012) as a way to understand biological phenomena by focusing on the historical 55 
nature of homologues. Wagner (2016) made much of this idea and considered it as the third 56 
leg of the “three-legged stool of evolutionary biology,” with the other two legs being 57 
population thinking and tree thinking (the latter style of thinking was proposed by O’Hara 58 
[1997] and recognizes that species are interconnected in an evolutionary tree).  59 
 To accomplish this goal, after characterizing typological, population, and homology 60 
thinking (Section 2), I evaluate the epistemological advantages and disadvantages of 61 
typological and population thinking in macro/mega- and micro-evolutionary scales with an 62 
examination of how the notion of homology contributes to explanations in each case 63 
(Sections 3 and 4, respectively). Typological thinking often has greater explanatory power 64 
than population thinking in the macro- and mega-evolutionary scales because of the lack of 65 
population traceability, whereas population thinking dominates the micro-evolutionary scale. 66 
I also point out that the approaches of modern molecular biology, including those adopted in 67 
developmental biology and Evo-Devo, have a methodological affinity to typological thinking. 68 
Then I discuss how typological and population thinking can fruitfully be mediated by 69 
                                                
1Here “the gap is bridged” does not mean that the gap is completely filled or closed but that the two areas 
separated by the gap can be interrelated, although the gap remains. 
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homology thinking, with reference to studies of teratology and breeding as examples (Section 70 
5). Finally, I examine the philosophical status of homology thinking and explore possible 71 
methods to bridge typological and population thinking at the epistemological level (Section 72 
6). For the purpose of this conceptual bridging, it is crucial to recognize the dynamic aspects 73 
of homology. I thus introduce a recently proposed homology concept that highlights its 74 
dynamicity (Suzuki and Tanaka 2017) and suggest that such dynamic views of homology 75 
have the potential to bridge the gap between typological and population thinking and to set 76 
the stage for a new evolutionary synthesis. 77 
 78 
2. Type, population, and homology: Styles of thinking in biology 79 
Biologists and philosophers have characterized and discussed several “styles of thinking” in 80 
biology, each of which is a specific way to view the living world. Different styles of thinking 81 
recognize or highlight different aspects of biological phenomena. They are often associated 82 
with different sets of observational, experimental, and representational practices, as well as 83 
with different research fields. In this section, I first describe two such styles of thinking 84 
(typological and population thinking), with a focus on how previous studies have formulated 85 
the relationship between them. Then, I introduce and characterize homology thinking, which 86 
is another style of thinking that operates in the field of evolutionary biology. 87 
 Ernst Mayr, in the 1950s, formulated the concepts of typological thinking and 88 
population thinking, which according to him, are fundamentally incompatible (Amundsen 89 
2005; Chung 2003; Mayr 1959b). He originally treated this dichotomy only in a taxonomic 90 
context (pre-Darwinian species fixists versus neo-Darwinists), but eventually elevated it to 91 
being the major problem in all biological disciplines, and then in the entire history of Western 92 
thought (Amundsen 2005, 205). According to Mayr, typological thinking sees “a limited 93 
number of fixed, unchangeable ‘ideas’ underlying the observed variability” and hence 94 
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conceives the natural world by classifying things into discrete categories (Mayr 1959a, 2). 95 
This style of thinking is in sharp contrast with population thinking, which recognizes the 96 
uniqueness of individuals in the world:  97 
 98 
“All organisms and organic phenomena are composed of unique features and can be 99 
described collectively only in statistical terms. Individuals, or any kind of organic 100 
entities, form populations of which we can determine the arithmetic mean and 101 
statistics of variation. Averages are merely statistical abstractions, only the 102 
individuals of which the populations are composed have reality. The ultimate 103 
conclusions of the population thinker and of the typologist are precisely the opposite. 104 
For the typologist, the type (eidos) is real and the variation an illusion, while for the 105 
populationist the type (average) is an abstraction and only the variation is real. No two 106 
ways of looking at nature could be more different.” (Mayr 1959a, 2) 107 
 108 
 Mayr argues that this incompatibility between the two metaphysics is the reason why 109 
embryology or developmental biology was excluded from the ES; population thinking is the 110 
basic metaphysics of the ES. Evolution is understood as a change in the frequencies of an 111 
allele in a population. By contrast, the study of biological development relies on typologist 112 
metaphysics, and hence cannot be integrated into the theoretical and conceptual framework of 113 
the ES (Mayr 1980).  114 
 Recently, several historical and philosophical studies have pointed out problems in 115 
Mayr’s formulation of the conflict between the two styles of thinking (Levit and Meister 116 
2006; Lewens 2009a, 2009b; Love 2009; Winsor 2006). An idea that is shared by some of 117 
those studies is that typological thinking does not have to be and has not always been 118 
metaphysical. For example, Levit and Meister (2006) examined some idealistic 119 
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morphological theories. According to them, typology was a conceptual tool for classification 120 
based on structural characters and had no necessary connection with a problematic 121 
metaphysical view of life, such as essentialism or species fixism, which Mayr wrongly 122 
associated with typology. Love (2009) pursued a similar idea by taking a philosophical 123 
approach. Viewed from an epistemological perspective, typological thinking plays a crucial 124 
role in scientific practice by facilitating various activities through idealization and 125 
approximation. Love (2009) encouraged a reconfiguration of typology in terms of scientific 126 
practice or epistemology, instead of metaphysics, to appreciate the importance of typology. 127 
 I share with these authors the view that it is more fruitful to interpret typological 128 
thinking in terms of epistemology. However, even if we shift our attention from metaphysics 129 
to epistemology, the question remains of how to integrate studies based on these two different 130 
styles of thinking. The two styles of thinking are suitable for investigating different 131 
evolutionary timescales; while population thinking traces changes in allele frequencies in a 132 
population at the micro-evolutionary scale, typological thinking idealizes discrete character 133 
states that emerge through macro/mega-evolutionary processes. If the EES aims to provide a 134 
comprehensive picture of evolution involving different evolutionary timescales, the two 135 
styles of thinking must be mediated or bridged (see Sections 3 & 4). 136 
 Another style of thinking that we discuss here is homology thinking. Although the 137 
notion of homology has a deep historical root, it is only in the last decade that the notion has 138 
been discussed as a particular style of thinking that parallels typological and population 139 
thinking. Ereshefsky (2012) characterized homology thinking as an approach of historical 140 
explanation, which accounts for a certain character by referring to its history. Following this 141 
characterization, Wagner (2016) proposed that homology thinking consists of three insights: 142 
multicellular organisms are composed of sub-systems, which are developmentally 143 
individualized; those sub-systems can change independently via evolutionary processes; and 144 
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those sub-systems are indirectly inherited and constitute lineages. Therefore, homology 145 
thinking focuses on developmentally and evolutionarily quasi-independent sub-systems (i.e., 146 
modules) of an organism and explains their properties by referring to their histories. 147 
 It is notable that Ereshefsky (2012) and Wagner (2016) stressed different (but non-148 
exclusive) aspects of homology thinking; the former highlighted the historical continuity of a 149 
character, while the latter underscored its dynamics and mechanisms in evolutionary and 150 
developmental processes. In this paper, I simply and minimally characterize homology 151 
thinking as “recognition of the sameness of a character (both between different organisms 152 
and within an organism).” In other words, it is the art of identifying characters in different 153 
contexts. Here the two aforementioned views can be regarded as being based on different 154 
grounds for “sameness:” one on historical continuity and the other on dynamics and 155 
mechanisms.2 Recognition of homologs can be given without assumption of any “type,” and 156 
without consideration of any population (for example, see the below mentioned case of 157 
identifying homologous characters in fossils). Thus, homology thinking is essentially 158 
independent of typological and population thinking. On the contrary, it provides a crucial 159 
basis for these two ways of thinking and bridges the gap between them as discussed below. 160 
 161 
3. Macro/mega-evolution 162 
In this and the next section, I discuss how the different styles of thinking contribute to 163 
different aspects of evolutionary research. I point out the following difference: typological 164 
thinking plays a significant role in the study of macro- and mega-evolution; population 165 
thinking serves as the basis of the study of micro-evolution; and homology thinking 166 
facilitates research in both contexts. First, let us define micro-, macro- and mega-evolution. 167 
                                                
2Note that these “grounds” do not necessarily provide certain criteria for the identification of homologs. We can 
recognize homologs, even if neither their historical continuity nor developmental mechanism is clear. See 
Remane (1952) for the most prominent operational criteria of homology (summarized in Griffiths 2007,  648). 
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According to Dobzhansky (1937, 12), macro-evolutionary changes occur on geological time 168 
scales, while micro-evolutionary processes are observable within the span of a human 169 
lifetime (i.e., intra-specific). Thus, macro-evolution in Dobzhansky’s sense can be applied to 170 
broad evolutionary scales, ranging from trans-specific to trans-phylar levels. The term mega-171 
evolution was introduced by Simpson (1944), who referred to evolution at the larger scale 172 
(i.e., at the trans-phylar level) as a special case of macro-evolution (Simpson 1944, 98).3 173 
 Many researchers, including Dobzhansky, assume that macro-evolution can be 174 
explained by the same logic as micro-evolution. As Futuyma (1998, 477) wrote, “one of the 175 
most important tenets of the theory forged during the Evolutionary Synthesis” was that 176 
macro-evolutionary differences “arise from the accumulation of the same kinds of genetic 177 
differences that are found within species.” I do not intend to refute this assumption. In fact, 178 
there is much paleontological evidence that demonstrates gradual changes in trans-specific 179 
and trans-generic evolution (i.e., macro-evolution sensu stricto) (Levinton 2001, Ch. 6). 180 
However, when we focus on larger evolutionary scales (particularly at the mega-evolutionary 181 
level), we actually face greater difficulty in tracing the population continuity than we do with 182 
micro-evolution. This difficulty appears to be derived from the incompleteness of the 183 
sedimentary and fossil records (Levinton 2001, 365). That is, even if it is theoretically 184 
possible, it is practically difficult to know the population dynamics and thus to adopt 185 
population thinking at larger scales. Therefore, the explanatory power of population thinking 186 
becomes more limited at these scales. 187 
 Instead of population thinking, homology plays a more important explanatory role 188 
here. Particularly at the mega-evolutionary level, identifying homologous characters bridges 189 
the gaps between different geological times and provides crucial clues to reconstruct the 190 
                                                
3It is notable that Simpson (1944, 98) argued that “the paleontologist has more reason to believe in a qualitative 
distinction between macro-evolution and mega-evolution than in one between micro-evolution and macro-
evolution.” 
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evolutionary history. For example, the presence of the notochord, gill slits (or gill pouches), 191 
and vertebral elements are considered markers of vertebrates, for which the evolutionary 192 
continuity of the earliest fossils has huge gaps and is not traceable at all (e.g., Haikouichthys, 193 
Shu et al., 2003; Metaspriggina, Conway Morris and Caron 2014; Tully monster 194 
Tullimonstrum, McCoy et al. 2016). On the contrary, the existence of homologous characters 195 
suggests evolutionary continuity from these ancestral lineages to their recent relatives. 196 
Furthermore, the identification of homologs in a fossil does not necessarily require 197 
typological thinking (abstraction, generalization, idealization, or approximation), although 198 
this way of thinking is required for reconstruction and schematic illustration of these fossil 199 
animals (see below). 200 
 Even at smaller scales (macro-evolution sensu stricto, such as trans-specific and trans-201 
generic levels), we often track certain homologous characters to reconstruct the evolutionary 202 
changes. For example, in the evolution of horses, where it is shown that the digits were 203 
gradually degenerated, we identify the homologous digits in different species and then figure 204 
out which digits were degenerated or conserved (Solounias et al. 2018, and literature cited 205 
within). 206 
 Typological thinking also plays an important role at macro- and mega-evolutionary 207 
scales. For example, we often schematically represent morphological characters as discrete 208 
types to recognize general features shared across taxa (such as the ground plan of the tetrapod 209 
limb). Such representational typology is found broadly in biology in general (e.g., protein 210 
domains, modes of locomotion, and developmental stages) (Love 2009). As Love (2009) 211 
argued, typological thinking can be understood as a scientific tactic to represent natural 212 
phenomena using idealizations and approximations. The use of typology to represent natural 213 
phenomena with abstraction and generalization facilitates explanation, investigation, and 214 
theorizing in different research fields of biology.  215 
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 In summary, the explanatory power of population thinking is limited at the macro- 216 
and mega-evolutionary scales. Homology and typological thinking are more effective at such 217 
geological timescales because of the limitation of population traceability.  218 
  219 
4. Micro-evolution 220 
In contrast to the case of macro- and mega-evolution, population thinking has overwhelming 221 
explanatory power at the micro-evolutionary scale, where populations are continuously 222 
traceable. By quantifying statistical parameters, such as population size and phenotypic 223 
variance, evolutionary biologists are able to evaluate the effects of natural selection, genetic 224 
drift, and so on (reviewed in Saccheri and Hanski 2008). Homology thinking also plays an 225 
important role in these studies. When researchers focus on a certain character of interest and 226 
trace its evolutionary trajectory, they need to be able to identify the homologous character in 227 
various individuals. For example, in the case of beak evolution in Darwin’s finches (Grant 228 
and Grant 2002), the beaks must be identified consistently as homologs. Although some may 229 
consider this a truism, these researchers successfully identify homologs in different 230 
organisms. In fact, misidentification sometimes happens, especially when focusing on a 231 
character that is seemingly homologous but in fact homoplastic as a result of convergence or 232 
parallelism. From this point of view, these researchers certainly exercise homology thinking, 233 
whether or not they are aware of it. Therefore, the notion of homology is a prerequisite for 234 
studying character dynamics at a micro-evolutionary scale. Here we find a clue as to how to 235 
bridge the gap between typological and population thinking at the micro-evolutionary scale 236 
(see Section 4). 237 
 On the other hand, typological thinking is less explanatory at micro-evolutionary 238 
scales. Typological thinking necessarily filters out variation in a population to abstract a type 239 
and hence fails to recognize gradual evolutionary changes. A significant form of variation 240 
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filtering is genetic standardization of experimental organisms; experimental genetics and 241 
molecular biology often establish “pure lines” or “inbred lines” of their experimental 242 
organisms to make the genetic background as identical as possible (Ankeny and Leonelli 243 
2011). Genetic variation is considered noise here because they could mask the experimental 244 
effect. Some Evo-Devo researchers also rely on the use of standardized organisms and hence 245 
have the tendency to overlook variation. For example, when they compare developmental 246 
traits or expression patterns of homologous genes between two species, they tend to compare 247 
averages of the traits or expression patterns. Let us consider an imaginary case of a researcher 248 
who focuses on the contribution of gene X to the development of a morphological trait Y and 249 
asks whether or not expression of X in the development of Y is conserved in vertebrates or 250 
not. For this purpose, the researcher might use several model organisms, such as the mouse, 251 
chick, Xenopus, and zebrafish, and examine the expression patterns of X in these animals. In 252 
such a case, varieties within each species are ignored, and the species under research are 253 
treated as types instead of as variable populations. Furthermore, expression patterns are often 254 
represented as schematic illustrations, which can be considered typical examples of 255 
representational typology. 256 
 Nonetheless, this statistical type does not necessarily presuppose typological thinking 257 
in an essentialist sense; it can be a statistical “modality descriptor” (Levinton 2001, 13), 258 
which is not real and has no causal efficacy (sensu Sober 1980), but rather represents a modal 259 
form of a population. However, even if it is metaphysically non-problematic, variation-260 
filtering poses an epistemological and methodological issue because typological and 261 
population thinking fundamentally differ in how they treat variation; the former ignores it, 262 
whereas to the latter, variation is the most crucial part of evolutionary processes. This 263 
difference makes it difficult to mediate the two styles of thinking to acquire a more 264 
comprehensive picture of evolution by combining results and approaches from various fields, 265 
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some of which rely heavily on typological thinking (i.e., developmental biology, morphology, 266 
and paleontology) and others of which are based mainly on population thinking (i.e., 267 
population genetics). 268 
 269 
5. Bridging the gap: teratology and breeding 270 
An epistemological and methodological problem that prevents us from establishing an EES is 271 
that molecular developmental biology tends to filter out variation in a population of model 272 
organisms. To bridge the gap between typological thinking and population thinking, it is 273 
crucial to reconcile considerations of those features that are highlighted by the former (e.g., 274 
character identities and novelties) and those highlighted by the latter (e.g., variation). We can 275 
find hints of such bridging in studies of teratology focusing on developmental and 276 
morphological variation that might lead to evolutionary novelties (see Guinard 2012, 2015). 277 
Such studies involve both typological and population thinking to elucidate how a novel 278 
character emerges from variation in a population. Furthermore, homology thinking serves as 279 
a conceptual mediator between the two styles of thinking. 280 
 Let us consider the teratology of polydactyly as an example. Polydactyly is hand/foot 281 
malformation caused by digit duplication and presents several patterns: radial (prefixal), 282 
ulnar (postaxial), and central polydactyly (Farrugia and Calleja-Agius 2016). Radial 283 
polydactyly is the most common form (Crick et al. 2003), in which the extra digits appear 284 
anterior to the pollex (thumb) or the hallux (the thumb-toe). Although in most breeds of dogs 285 
the hallux is vestigial (the “dewclaw”) or even absent (particularly in small dogs), an extra 286 
(sixth) toe tends to appear (the “double-clawed” condition) in some breeds, such as the St. 287 
Bernard and Newfoundland, and is even a standard (i.e., artificially selected) for the Great 288 
Pyrenees and Norwegian Lundehund (Alberch 1985; Kropatsch et al. 2015). This sixth toe 289 
may have some adaptive advantages, such as for swimming, working through deep snow, or 290 
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preventing dogs from slipping off rocks (Prentis 1906; Galis et al. 2001; Kropatsch et al. 291 
2015). However, mutations for polydactyly are likely to have negative pleiotropic effects to 292 
other body parts and cause high mortality rates (Bonnet et al. 1997; Galis 2001), explaining 293 
why the sixth toe is not common in most dog breeds. Alberch (1985) proposed an alternative 294 
hypothesis, based on experiments in amphibians (Alberch and Gale 1983, 1985): larger 295 
breeds have a greater number of cells in the limb bud, which can produce an extra digit; 296 
smaller breeds have a smaller limb bud and hence lack a hallux. Indeed, the prepollex and 297 
prehallux (the extra skeletal elements anterior to the pollex and hallux, respectively) are 298 
observed in many frogs, although there is controversy on whether these are true digits or not, 299 
that is, whether there is serial homology between the extra digits and the other digits (Fabrezi 300 
2001; Hayashi et al. 2015). Fabrezi (2001) examined the prepollex and prehallux in various 301 
anuran (i.e., frog) species and discussed the homology, variation, and evolution of them (see 302 
also Tokita & Iwai 2010). An enlarged distal prehallical element is closely related to 303 
burrowing or fossorial habits and appears in several taxa (Fabrezi 2001, 244), indicating that 304 
it has some adaptive advantages. If this is true, we can infer that an extra digit is formed as a 305 
morphological variation in a certain generation, and then its homologs spread throughout a 306 
population on a micro-evolutionary scale. 307 
 Population, homology, and typological thinking all operate in the research of 308 
polydactyly. Polydactyly is found as variation in some populations of several tetrapod taxa 309 
and has been under natural, as well as artificial, selection. At the same time, morphological 310 
states are regarded and represented as discrete types (e.g., Fabrezi 2001, Fig. 12 and 13). The 311 
extra digits formed by polydactyly are also distinguished from other digits and discussed in 312 
terms of their phylogenetic homology (among several lineages) and serial homology 313 
(between extra digits and the other digits). Here we see that the notion of homology mediates 314 
the typological and population thinking. Discrete types of morphological states are given an 315 
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explicit evolutionary meaning by the recognition of homologous relationships within or 316 
between those types, while population thinking needs to recognize homologous characters 317 
prior to discussing their variation. 318 
 Let us imagine the case of prepollex evolution in frogs by comparing a population 319 
without (Frog A) and that with (Frog B) a prepollex (Fig. 1). At a glance, it seems that Frog 320 
A has four digits (as do most frogs), and Frog B has five digits, in the forelimb. It is unclear 321 
which digit in Frog A corresponds to which digit in Frog B (Fig. 1A, left). By careful 322 
examination (of anatomical elements, for example) via homology thinking, we can determine 323 
the digit homology, determining that there are skeletal elements of the prepollex in both Frog 324 
A and Frog B, although these parts are not outwardly visible in Frog A (Fig. 1A, right). 325 
Based on this homology and through typological thinking, we can then idealize the structure 326 
and illustrate it by schematic representation, where variations in each animal group are 327 
abstracted (Fig. 1B). At the same time, we are also able to hypothesize the character 328 
dynamics in frog populations through population thinking. For example, it is possible to 329 
assume that there were variations in an ancestral population, whereby some individuals (X*) 330 
possessed an obvious prepollex, while others (X) did not, and Frog B and Frog A are 331 
descendants of X* and X, respectively (Fig. 1C). We can test this hypothesis by examining 332 
detailed fossil records, as illustrated in the case of horse digits described above. 333 
 334 
[Fig. 1 Bridging role of homology thinking between typological and population thinking.] 335 
 336 
 Breeding is another example allowing coexistence of the three ways of thinking. 337 
Although I pointed out a negative epistemological aspect of inbreeding (variation filtering, 338 
see Section 4), breeding in general can be a good experimental model of evolution. Charles 339 
Darwin, in On the Origin of Species, presented his evolutionary theory with an analogy 340 
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between artificial and natural selection (Darwin 1859; Gayon 1998; Sterrett 2002). Some 341 
Evo-Devo researchers are studying evolutionary novelties using domestic breeds. For 342 
example, Ota and his colleagues (Abe et al. 2014; Ota and Abe 2016, Fig. 9) have revealed 343 
developmental mechanisms underlying the formation of twin-tail morphology in goldfish. 344 
They suggested that attractive and valuable ornamental morphologies such as the twin-tail 345 
have been the subject of strong directional selection, and the most preferred phenotypes are 346 
fixed by stabilizing selection. A similar evolutionary process can occur under natural 347 
selection as well, when a phenotypic variation is strongly advantageous in a certain 348 
environment. Recognizing homology is also important in tracing these processes; it enables 349 
us to identify whether the phenotype evolved once (homology) or more than once 350 
(convergence, parallel evolution, or homoplasy). Moreover, the states of single- and twin-tail 351 
are often illustrated as discrete representational types. 352 
 Variation-oriented morphological studies such as teratology and breeding can be a 353 
“buffer zone” between typological and population thinking, and the notion of homology can 354 
mediate them as a “bridge” or “hinge” (Fig. 1). Unlike typical cases of morphology or 355 
molecular developmental biology, these studies focus on variation in homologous characters, 356 
as does population genetics. At the same time, these studies enable us to recognize different 357 
morphological states as discrete types (e.g., polydactyly and twin-tail, as distinguished from 358 
the normal states). Homology thinking plays a bridging role here, providing a common basis 359 
for typological and population thinking by highlighting homologous characters. 360 
 One major reason why homology thinking can mediate typological and population 361 
thinking is that it applies across different timescales of evolution, i.e., it is scale-free. 362 
Although population thinking does play a predominant role at micro-evolutionary scales, its 363 
explanatory power becomes relatively week at macro- and mega-evolutionary scales. 364 
Conversely, typological thinking has epistemological advantages in studies of macro- and 365 
 16 
mega-evolution but has huge methodological weaknesses in the study of micro-evolution. 366 
Unlike these styles of thinking, homology thinking is not constrained by any specific scale of 367 
evolution. This is the key to mediate the other two styles of thinking: recognition of a 368 
homologous character is required both to trace character dynamics in a population during 369 
natural/artificial selection (population thinking) and to consider interestingly distinctive 370 
character states while making explicit their evolutionary meanings (representational version 371 
of typological thinking). The cases of polydactyly and breeding described above illustrate 372 
these functions of homology thinking.  373 
 374 
6. Rethinking homology thinking 375 
Although homology thinking can be a linchpin of typological and population thinking, we 376 
still need to examine what kind of homology concept is appropriate for this role. The 377 
ontological status of homology, in particular whether a homolog is a member of a natural 378 
kind or a part of an individual, has been a matter of intense debate (e.g., Assis and Brigandt 379 
2009; Ereshefsky 2009, 2010b; Suzuki and Tanaka 2017; Wagner 2014). It can be argued 380 
that homologs are members of a natural kind, which share essential properties or similar sets 381 
of properties (a homeostatic property cluster or HPC) (Assis and Brigandt 2009; Brigandt 382 
2007, 2009). On the other hand, homologs can be considered parts of an individual (i.e., a 383 
species as an ontological individual) that are historically connected rather than having any 384 
shared properties (Ereshefsky 2009, 228; Ghiselin 2005, 95). This controversy of individual 385 
versus natural kind first took place with respect to the problem of species (Ereshefsky 2007, 386 
2010a), where typological thinking and essentialism are often viewed as synonymous labels 387 
for a problematic way to comprehend species, which fails to comport with Darwinian 388 
evolutionary theory (see Amundson 2005; Brigandt 2017; Winsor 2006). 389 
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 Some authors have argued that a homolog can be construed as both a part of an 390 
individual and a member of a natural kind (e.g., Assis and Brigandt 2009; Brigandt 2009, 391 
2017), and they emphasize epistemological advantages (explanatory roles) of their view. As 392 
Evo-Devo research has focused much more on the developmental mechanisms of homologs, 393 
the idea of developmental type (including homology) as a natural kind has become reputable 394 
(Brigandt 2017; Wagner 2014; Rieppel 2005). This was made possible in part because, unlike 395 
the traditional natural kind view, new versions of the natural kind view allow some variability 396 
of properties that characterize a particular homolog. For example, the HPC view 397 
characterizes a homolog in terms of stable similarities based on a number of common 398 
properties, instead of strictly the same set of properties or essences. Thus, the natural kind 399 
view can accommodate evolutionary changes and variation in property clusters that 400 
characterize a homolog. 401 
 However, despite this modification, the natural kind view is not the best candidate for 402 
a concept of homology that serves to bridge typological and population thinking. Although 403 
theoretically the HPC view has room for changes and variation in property clusters, it still 404 
appears to have an inevitable tendency to filter out variation. This is because the focus of the 405 
HPC view is on the stability of property clusters: the view seeks a set of properties that are 406 
stably shared by instances of a homolog and also homeostatic basal mechanisms that are 407 
responsible for the stability. This specific focus may result in missing fluctuations, which can 408 
indeed be evolutionarily important.4 Capturing dynamicity and variability of homologs is the 409 
key to mediating typological and population thinking in evolutionary biology. In the 410 
remainder of this section, I discuss a recently proposed homology concept that emphasizes 411 
the dynamic aspects of homology: the persistently reproducible module (PRM) view (Suzuki 412 
and Tanaka, 2017). 413 
                                                
4For other problems of this theory in the context of homology, see Suzuki and Tanaka (2017). 
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 According to the PRM view, homologs are characterized as modules, persistently 414 
reproduced in evolutionary (i.e., reproduction) and developmental (i.e., regeneration) 415 
processes. For example, the eyes of a newt lineage are repetitively and persistently produced 416 
throughout generations, and the eyes in a newt can also be produced many times (Eguchi et al. 417 
2011). As evolutionary and developmental homologs, the eyes show both individual and 418 
natural kind aspects. On the one hand, they are historical (i.e., spatiotemporally restricted) 419 
entities engaging in evolutionary and developmental processes in a manner similar to 420 
individuals. On the other hand, their repetitive generation enables us to attribute shared 421 
properties to them and to regard and represent them as of the same type. An important point 422 
here is that we do not need to assume essences or homeostatic properties with basal 423 
mechanisms for their formation. We can characterize a homolog in terms of repetitive and 424 
persistent production of a phenotype. The shared characters and their basal mechanisms can 425 
dynamically change. 426 
 Indeed, the developmental mechanism for a homologous character changes in many 427 
cases. This phenomenon is known as developmental systems drift (DSD) (Haag and True 428 
2018; True and Haag 2001). For example, the neurulation mechanisms are significantly 429 
different between anamniotes (Xenopus), in which bone morphogenetic protein (BMP) 430 
signaling is necessary, and amniotes (chicks), in which there is no contribution of the BMP 431 
pathways. It is also notable that mechanisms underlying the formation of the same organ 432 
(homolog) are often different during development than during regeneration (Vervoort 2011), 433 
indicating that shared basal mechanisms are not requisite for the formation of homologs. 434 
 The PRM view can account for the homologous variation and novelty discussed in the 435 
previous section. For example, an extra digit can be considered a co-option of a digit module 436 
(see Suzuki and Tanaka 2017, Fig. 4). The homology of this extra digit is recognized if it is 437 
reproduced persistently through generations. Another example is the head spot of the Tancho 438 
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(“red-cap”) variety of the colored carp (Koi) (Suzuki and Tanaka 2017, 176). In this variety, 439 
the red pigmentation is found only at the top of the head, while its ancestral variety Kohaku 440 
(“red and white”) exhibits red and white color patterns in the whole body (Axelrod 1988). 441 
Thus, the head spot of Tancho appears to have evolved by restriction of the red pigmentation 442 
to the top of the head, or at least its separation from other trunk pigmentations. A breeder 443 
might have recognized this phenotype and planned to fix it as a strain, then when it began to 444 
be reproduced persistently through generations as homologs, the Tancho variety was 445 
established. 446 
 Although the persistency of module reproduction is key to recognizing homologs, 447 
persistency itself is a matter of degree. How many times should modules be persistently 448 
reproduced to be recognized as homologs? At least genetic fixation appears to be necessary 449 
for the establishment of homologs as PRMs, excluding the possibility that the modules are 450 
formed coincidentally. The certainty of homology increases when the formation mechanisms 451 
underlying PRMs are conserved, but these mechanisms are not necessarily always the same 452 
or even similar, considering DSD. Therefore, I postulate that homologs are established with 453 
genetically fixed persistency, via underlying mechanisms that are dynamically changeable. 454 
 Another view of homology that accommodates a certain form of dynamicity is 455 
proposed by Otsuka (2017), who suggests that homology can be defined as causal graph 456 
isomorphism over lineages, or conservation of the underlying causal structure over 457 
evolutionary history.5 This view contends that two mechanisms can be seen as homologous 458 
as long as their causal structures remain the same, even if the entities that constitute them 459 
differ. Although DSD seems to challenge this view, according to Otsuka, topological features 460 
of the causal network may remain invariant if the drift concerns only genetic or cellular 461 
materials (Otsuka 2017, 1136). 462 
                                                
5The relationship and compatibility between PRM and causal model views is worthy of further discussion. As 
this issue strays from the main topic in the current paper, however, it is left for future work. 
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 For the purpose of bridging the gap between typological and population thinking, it is 463 
important to adopt a homology concept that highlights the dynamic aspects of homology.6 464 
Such a homology concept can provide a conceptual foundation to relate character dynamics 465 
in a population with discrete types of character states. Although further discussion is needed 466 
to conclude which homology concept is best suited for this role, the PRM view appears to be 467 
a good candidate. 468 
 469 
7. Conclusion 470 
This paper discusses how homology thinking can bridge typological and population thinking. 471 
Even if we reject the fundamental incompatibility between typological and population 472 
thinking formulated by Mayr (1959b) and recognize the epistemological advantages of 473 
typological thinking, the question remains of how to relate the two styles of thinking for the 474 
integration of different kinds of evolutionary studies. I argue that homology thinking can 475 
facilitate such bridging, with reference to significant cases in teratology and breeding as 476 
examples. The variation-oriented morphological studies in these areas can serve as a “buffer 477 
zone,” where homology thinking provides a common basis for both tracing of character 478 
dynamics in a population over time and the evolutionary meaning of discrete types of 479 
character states. Homology thinking that highlights the dynamic aspects of homologs can 480 
promote productive cooperation between evolutionary and developmental biology and hence 481 
facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of evolution. 482 
 483 
                                                
6The processual philosophy of biology (Dupré and Nicholson 2018) is an ontological theory that has some 
affinity to a dynamic view of homology. According to the PRM view, for example, homologs are considered 
neither members of a natural kind nor parts of an individual but as subprocesses (each homolog) of a process 
(homologs as a whole) that exhibit coherence (modularity of each homolog) and persistence (persistent 
reproductivity of homologs). For a detailed discussion of coherence and persistence of biological processes, see 
DiFrisco (2018). Also, dispositionalism in the processual philosophy of biology might provide a better 




I thank Yusaku Ohkubo, Senji Tanaka, and Yoshinari Yoshida and two anonymous reviewers 485 
for their valuable comments. 486 
 487 
Funding 488 
A part of this work is financially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 489 
(JSPS), Grant Number 18J00045 and 20K00275. 490 
 491 
Conflict of interest 492 
The author declares that he has no conflict of interest. 493 
 494 
Availability of data and material  495 
Not applicable. 496 
 497 
Code availability  498 
Not applicable 499 
 500 
References 501 
Abe G, Lee SH, Chang M, Liu SC, Tsai HY, Ota KG (2014) The origin of the bifurcated 502 
axial skeletal system in the twin-tail goldfish. Nat Commun 5:3360 503 
Alberch P (1985) Developmental constraints: why St. Bernards often have an extra digit and 504 
poodles never do. Am Nat 126, 430–433 505 
Alberch P, Gale EA (1983) Size dependence during the development of the amphibian foot. 506 
Cochicine-induced digital loss and reduction. J Embryol Exp Morphol 76:177–197 507 
 22 
Alberch P, Gale EA (1985) A developmental analysis of an evolutionary trend: digital 508 
reduction in amphibians. Evolution 39:8–23 509 
Amundson R (2005) The changing role of the embryo in evolutionary thought: roots of Evo-510 
Devo. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge 511 
Ankeny RA, Leonelli S (2011) What’s so special about model organisms? Studies in History 512 
and Philosophy of Science 42:313–23 513 
Anjum RL, Mumford S (2018) Dispositionalism: a dynamic theory of causation. In: 514 
Nicholson DJ, Dupré J (eds.) Everything flows: towards a processual Philosophy of 515 
biology. Oxford Univ Press, Oxford, pp. 61–75 516 
Assis LCS, Brigandt I (2009) Homology: homeostatic property cluster kinds in systematics 517 
and evolution. Evol Biol 36:248–255 518 
Axelrod HR (1988) Koi varieties: Japanese colored carp–Nishikigoi. TFH Publications, 519 
Neptune 520 
Bonnett BN, Egenvall A, Olson P, Hedhammar A (1997) Mortality in insured Swedish dogs: 521 
rates and causes of death in various breeds. Vet Rec 141:40–44 522 
Brigandt I (2007) Typology now: homology and developmental constraints explain 523 
ecolvability. Biol Philos 22:709–725 524 
Brigandt I (2009) Natural kinds in evolution and systematics: metaphysical and 525 
epistemological considerations. Acta Biotheor 57:77–97 526 
Brigandt I (2017) Typology and natural kinds in evo-devo. In: Nuño De La Rosa L, Müller G 527 
(eds) Evolutionary developmental biology: a reference guide. Springer, Cham, pp. 1–11 528 
Churchill FB (1980) The modern evolutionary synthesis and the biogenetic law. In: Mayr E, 529 
Provine WB (eds.) The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives on the unification of biology. 530 
Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, pp. 97–112 531 
 23 
Chung C (2003) On the origin of the typological/population distinction in Ernst Mayr’s 532 
changing views of species, 1942–1959. Stud Hist Philos  Sci C 34 (2):277–296 533 
Coleman W (1980) Morphology in the evolutionary synthesis. In: Mayr E, Provine WB (eds.) 534 
The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives on the unification of biology. Harvard Univ 535 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 174–180 536 
Conway Morris S, Caron J-B (2014) A primitive fish from the Cambrian of North America. 537 
Nature 512(7515):419–422 538 
Crick AP, Babbs C, Brown JM, Morriss-kay GM. (2003) Developmental mechanisms 539 
underlying polydactyly in the mouse mutant doublefoot. J Anat 202(1):21–26 540 
Darwin C (1859) On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation 541 
of favoured races in the struggle for life. J Murray, London 542 
DiFrisco J (2018) Biological processes. In: Nicholson DJ, Dupré J (eds.) Everything flows: 543 
towards a processual Pphilosophy of biology. Oxford Univ Press, Oxford, pp. 76–95 544 
Dobzhansky T (1937) Genetics and the origin of species. Columbia University Press, New 545 
York 546 
Dupré J, Nicholson DJ (2018) A manifesto for a processual philosophy of biology. In: 547 
Nicholson DJ, Dupré J (eds.) Everything flows: towards a processual Pphilosophy of 548 
biology. Oxford Univ Press, Oxford, pp. 3–45 549 
Eguchi G, Eguchi Y, Nakamura K, Yadav MC, Millán JL, Tonis PA (2011) Regenerative 550 
capacity in newts is not altered by repeated regeneration and ageing. Nat Commun 2:384 551 
Ereshefsky M (2007) Foundational issues concerning taxa and taxon names. Syst Biol 552 
56:295–301 553 
Ereshefsky M (2009) Homology: integrating phylogeny and development. Biol Theor 4:225–554 
229 555 
 24 
Ereshefsky M (2010a) Species. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 556 
(Spring 2010 edition). http://plato.stan-ford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/species/ 557 
Ereshefsky M (2010b) What’s wrong with the new biological essentialism. Philos Sci 558 
77:674–685 559 
Ereshefsky M (2012) Homology thinking. Biol Philos 27:381–400 560 
Fabrezi M (2001) A survey of prepollex and prehallux variation in anuran limbs. Zool J 561 
Linnean Soc 131:227–48 562 
Farrugia MC, Calleja-Agius J. (2016) Polydactyly: A Review. Neonatal Netw 35(3):135–142. 563 
Futuyma D (1988) Evolutionary biology, 3rd edition. Sinauer Associates, Sunderland 564 
Galis F, van Alphen J, Metz J. 2001. Why five fingers? Evolutionary constraints on digit 565 
numbers. Trends Ecol Evol. 16(11):637–646 566 
Gayon J (1998) Darwinism’s struggle for survival: heredity and the hypothesis of natural 567 
selection. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge 568 
Ghiselin MT (1980) The failure of morphology to assimilate Darwinism. In: Mayr E, Provine 569 
WB (eds.) The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives on the unification of biology. 570 
Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, pp. 180–193 571 
Ghiselin MT (2005) Homology as a relation of correspondence between parts of individuals. 572 
Theor Biosci 124:91–103 573 
Ghiselin MT (2006) The failure of morphology to contribute to the modern synthesis. Theor 574 
Biosci 124(3-4):309–316 575 
Grant PR and Grant BR (2002) Unpredictable evolution in a 30-year study of Darwin’s 576 
finches. Science 296(5568):707–711 577 
Griffiths PE (2007) The phenomena of homology. Biol Philos 22, 643–658 578 
Guinard G (2012) Evolutionary concepts meet the neck of penguins (Aves: Sphenisciformes), 579 
towards a “survival strategy” for evo-devo. Theory Biosci 131(4):231–242 580 
 25 
Guinard G (2015) Introduction to evolutionary teratology, with the example of forelimbs of 581 
Tyrannosauridae and Carnotaurinae (Dinosauria: Theropoda). Evol Biol 42:20–41 582 
Haag ES, True JR (2018) Developmental system drift. In: Nuno de la Rosa L., Müller G. 583 
(eds.) Evolutionary developmental biology. Springer, Cham 584 
Hamburger V (1980) Embryology and the Modern Synthesis in evolutionary theory. In: Mayr 585 
E, Provine WB (eds.) The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives on the unification of 586 
biology. Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, pp. 97–112 587 
Hayashi S, Kobayashi T, Yano T, Kamiyama N, Egawa S, Seki R, Takizawa K, Okabe M, 588 
Yokoyama H, Tamura K. Evidence for an amphibian sixth digit. Zool Lett 1:17 589 
Kropatsch R, Melis C, Stronen AV, Jensen H,  Epplen JT (2015) Molecular genetics of sex 590 
identification, breed ancestry and polydactyly in the Norwegian Lundehund breed. J 591 
Hered 106(4):403–406 592 
Laland KN, Uller T, Feldman MW, Sterelny K, Müller GB, Moczek A, Jablonka E, Odling-593 
Smee J (2015) The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and 594 
predictions. Proc Biol Sci 282(1813):20151019 595 
Laubichler M, Maienschein J (2007) From embryology to evo-devo: a history of 596 
developmental evolution. MIT Press, Cambridge and London 597 
Levinton J (2001) Genetics, paleontology and macroevolution, 2nd ed. Cambridge Univ. 598 
Press, New York 599 
Levit, GS, Meister K (2006) The history of essentialism vs. Ernst Mayr’s ‘essentialism 600 
story’: A case study of German idealistic morphology. Theor Biosci 124: 281–307 601 
Lewens T (2009a) Evo-devo and “typological thinking”: an exculpation. J Exp Zool B 602 
312(8):789–96 603 
Lewens T (2009b) What is wrong with typological thinking? Philos Sci 76: 355–71 604 
 26 
Love AC (2009) Typology reconfigured: from the metaphysics of essentialism to the 605 
epistemology of representation. Acta Biotheor 57:51–75 606 
Mayr, E. (1959a). Darwin and the evolutionary theory in biology. In J. Meggers (ed.), 607 
Evolution and anthropology: a centennial appraisal. The Anthroplogical Society of 608 
Washington, Washington, pp. 1–10 609 
Mayr E (1959b) Typological and population thinking. In: Meggers BJ (ed.) Evolution and 610 
anthropology: a centennial appraisal. The Anthroplogical Society of Washington, 611 
Washington, pp. 409–412 612 
Mayr E (1980) Prologue: Some thoughts on the history of the evolutionary synthesis. In: 613 
Mayr E, Provine WB (eds.) The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives on the unification 614 
of biology. Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–48 615 
McCoy VE, Saupe EE, Lamsdell JC, Lidya G. Tarhan LG, McMahon S, Lidgard S, Mayer P, 616 
Whalen CD, Soriano C, Finney L, Vogt S, Clark EG, Anderson RP, Petermann H, 617 
Locatelli ER, Briggs DE (2016). The ‘Tully monster’ is a vertebrate. Nature 618 
532(7600):496–499 619 
O’hara RJ (1997) Population thinking and tree thinking in systematics. Zool Scr 26(4):323–620 
329 621 
Ota KG, Abe G (2016) Goldfish morphology as a model for evolutionary developmental 622 
biology. WIREs Dev Biol 5:272–295 623 
Otsuka J (2017) The causal homology concept. Phil Sci 84(5):1128–1139 624 
Owen R (1848) On the archetype and homologies of the vertebrate skeleton. Jon Van Voorst, 625 
London 626 
Pigliucci M, Müller GB (2010) Evolution: the extended synthesis. MIT Press, Cambridge 627 
Prentis CW (1906) Extra digits and digital reductions. Popular Sci Mon 68:335–348 628 
 27 
Remane A (1952) Die Grundlagen des natürlichen Systems, der vergleichenden Anatomie 629 
und der Phylogenetik. Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig 630 
Rieppel O (2005) Modules, kinds and homology. J Exp Zool B 304:18–27 631 
Saccheri I, Hanski I (2008) Natural selection and population dynamics. Trends Ecol Evol 632 
21(6): 341–347 633 
Shu DG, Conway Morris S, Han J, Zhang ZF, Yasui K, Janvier P, Chen L, Zhang XL, Liu JN, 634 
Li Y, Liu H-Q, (2003) Head and backbone of the Early Cambrian vertebrate 635 
Haikouichthys. Nature 421(6922):526–529 636 
Simpson GG (1944) Tempo and Mode in Evolution. Columbia University Press. New York. 637 
Sober E (1980) Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism. Phil Sci 47(3):350–383 638 
Solounias N, Danowitz M, Stachtiaris E, Khurana A, Araim M, Sadegh M, Natale J (2018) 639 
The evolution and anatomy of the horse manus with an emphasis on digit reduction. R 640 
Soc Open Sci 2018:5 641 
Sterrett SG (2002) Darwin’s analogy between artificial and natural selection: how does it go? 642 
Stud Hist Philos Sci C 33(1):151–168 643 
Suzuki DG, Tanaka S (2017) A phenomenological and dynamic view of homology: 644 
Homologs as persistently reproducible modules. Biol Theor 12(3):169–180 645 
Tokita M, Iwai N (2010) Development of the pseudothumb in frogs. Biol Lett 6:517–520 646 
True JR, Haag ES (2001) Developmental system drift and  exibility in evolutionary 647 
trajectories. Evol Dev 3:109–119 648 
Vervoort M (2011) Regeneration and Development in Animals. Biol Theor 6:25–35 649 
Wagner GP (2014) Homology, genes, and evolutionary innovation. Princeton Univ Press, 650 
Princeton 651 
Wagner GP (2016) What is “homology thinking” and what is it for? J Exp Zool B Mol Dev 652 
Evol 326(1):3–8 653 
 28 
Winsor MP (2006) The creation of the essentialism story: an exercise in metahistory. Hist 654 
Philos Life Sci 28:149–174 655 
 656 
Figure legend 657 
Fig. 1. Bridging role of homology thinking between typological and population thinking. (A) 658 
Homology thinking. (B) Typological thinking. (C) Population thinking. I, II, III, and IV 659 
indicate the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th digits, and * indicates the prepollex, respectively. See text for 660 
details. Illustrations are based on Tokita and Iwai (2010). 661 
 662 
Homology thinking Recognition of homologs
Population thinking






































Frog A Frog B
IVIIIII
I
*
IVIIIII
I
*
Typological thinking
Schematic representation
examination
A.
B. C.
